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Abstract. This work aims to highlight the fundamental issue surrounding biometric security
systems: it’s all very nice until a biometric is forged, but what do we do after that? Granted,
biometric systems are by physical nature supposedly much harder to forge than other factors
of authentication since biometrics on a human body are by right unique to the particular hu-
man person. Yet it is also due to this physical nature that makes it much more catastrophic
when a forgery does occur, because it implies that this uniqueness has been forged as well,
threatening the human individuality; and since crime has by convention relied on identifying
suspects by biometric characteristics, loss of this biometric uniqueness has devastating conse-
quences on the freedom and basic human rights of the victimized individual. This uniqueness
forgery implication also raises the motivation on the adversary to forge since a successful
forgery leads to much more impersonation situations when biometric systems are used i.e.
physical presence at crime scenes, identification and access to security systems and premises,
access to financial accounts and hence the ability to use the victim’s finances. Depending on
the gains, a desperate highly motivated adversary may even resort to directly obtaining the
victim’s biometric parts by force e.g. severing the parts from the victim’s body; this poses
a risk and threat not just to the individual’s uniqueness claim but also to personal safety
and well being. One may then wonder if it is worth putting one’s assets, property and safety
into the hands of biometrics based systems when the consequences of biometric forgery far
outweigh the consequences of system compromises when no biometrics are used.
1 The Case
The aim of this work is to put forth the case of explicitly designing biometric security systems
with a forgiving feature; i.e. to be forge-resilient. To be more precise, we feel that biometric
systems need to be able to recover from the incident that the underlying biometric character-
istic type (e.g. fingerprint, face) becomes forgeable; or “cloneable” in biometric speak. Current
biometric systems are designed without resilience to these incidents, i.e. security breaks down
entirely when a characteristic becomes forgeable, with no option for incident recovery.
While compromise-resilient systems exist in cryptographic literature, e.g. intrusion-resilience
[13, 10], key-insulation [11], leakage-resilience [21], key compromise-resilience, forward secu-
rity [6, 7], or even fault-tolerance, we believe it makes sense even more so in the context of
biometric systems to consider this resilience issue. The reason is this. It is common knowl-
edge that biometrics while similar to more conventional authentication factors like passwords
or chip cards, are irreplaceable and irrevocable. Thus, when a biometric characteristic of a
legitimate party falls into the hands of an adversary in the forgeable sense, the legitimate
party permanently loses the ability to use that characteristic in any biometric security sys-
tem that authenticates using that type of characteristic. One may suggest to then replace
the underlying characteristic type with another, e.g. using hand geometry instead of finger-
prints; yet there is only a finite space of possible characteristic types on a human person
that can be used. What is more, any evidence of the forged characteristic being found would
non-repudiably bind to that party.
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22 Setting the Stage
2.1 Question Marks
Motivated by the case above, we feel therefore that one should treat forge-resilience from two
perspectives: forward security and convertibility. This leads to the following questions.
Q1. Forward Security: Is there still any security that can be salvaged in the event that a
characteristic type becomes forgeable with technology advances? If so, how can this
remnant security be quantified?
Q2. Convertibility: Can biometric systems be designed such that the irrevocable feature is
removed at the point when a characteristic type becomes forgeable? This notion could
be compared with that of convertible digital signatures.
Thinking beyond forge-resilience towards a longer term goal of forge-resistance, we pose the
following question that would be interesting to solve.
Q3. Ageing: can we design biometric systems with an ageing feature? i.e. where each subse-
quent sensing of a real (non-forged) biometric characteristic can be shown to be a more
recent one compared to a previously sensed characteristic. In some sense, though not
exactly identical, this feature could be compared to the notion of hash chains. Certainly,
answering this question would make biometric systems resilient to characteristic forgery
since a real one would then naturally post-date a forged one. In essence, an answer is
not impossible because even if a forged characteristic appears identical to the real one,
it is still an analog duplication (rather than digital) since it is physical in nature. The
other distinguishing feature between a real and forged one is that the former is a physical
biological characteristic that necessarily ages over time (e.g. skin cells are shed as a func-
tion of time), thus being able to capture this physical trait would aid in distinguishing
between the two.
Finally, we believe that research into the above questions would progress well within a soundly
defined framework that allows for rigour and unambiguity in the understanding of components
that make up biometric systems, and all relevant properties that need to be captured. This
raises the question below, the answer to which will cast research in this field into a strong
setting.
Q4. Formal Models: can we rigorously model the security of biometric systems in the pres-
ence of forgeable biometric characteristics, and in the context of the above two main
perspectives?
2.2 Moving Forward
To work towards solving the above open questions, immediate steps would naturally involve
the following.
M1. Formal Models: Formalization of security in biometric systems to achieve forge-resilience:
what security do we still want to uphold when the underlying biometric characteristic
becomes forgeable with technological advances in physical or materials sciences?
M2. Forge-Resilience: Design of secure (in the reductionist security sense, with respect to the
above formalization) biometric systems with forge-resilience, namely exhibiting either or
both the following properties:
• Forward Security: systems that still offer some remnant security when a characteristic
type becomes forgeable, and before the system (or more practically the relevant
underlying component) is redesigned such that system security is recovered, i.e. it is
no longer impacted by such forgery.
• Convertibility: systems such that upon the point of characteristic forgery, the non-
repudiable binding of the characteristic to the party is removed, to prevent him being
framed for crimes/actions he did not commit.
M3. It may be worth to design such systems using the ceremony approach [14], i.e. where
humans are treated as network entities separate from the machines that they use; and
taking human factors into consideration such as social and psychological issues. This
is useful for instance since human tendency influences the captureability of biometric
characteristics, which may impact unforgeability.
32.3 Biometric Security System
To kick off, it is worthwhile to treat a biometric security system with some notations.
Definition 1 [Matching]. Two biometric features F1, F2 are said to be matching (denoted
F1 ↔ F2) if on input to a matcher algorithm M the output returns a “yes”.
Definition 2 [Biometric System]. A biometric system B = (S, E ,M) is a triple of the
following algorithms:
sensor; S ← S(C). This senses the physical biometric characteristic C (sometimes used
interchangeably with trait) of the human body e.g. fingerprint, iris, etc, and outputs a
biometric snapshot S.
extractor; F ← E(S). This processes the biometric snapshot S and extracts at its output
a biometric feature F (sometimes also called a template), that is essentially a represen-
tation of the biometric characteristic.
matcher; D ←M(F, dB). This takes as input a biometric feature F and a database dB
of stored biometric feature templates F˜ ; and via a matching process defined by some
predetermined rules then outputs a decision D ∈ {“yes”, “no”} signifying the biometric
authentication result, i.e. “yes” if F and at least one F˜ match and “no” otherwise.
3 Forge Resilience
Some kind of forge-resilient biometric systems have been proposed in literature that aim
to differentiate between real and forged biometric characteristics by measuring the liveness
property (sometimes called vitality) i.e. whether the characteristic is alive (real) or non-alive
(forged), e.g. temperature under the skin, pulsation, perspiration [1], skin elasticity [2], skin
odour [4], existence of blood veins [8], although it is not absolutely certain to what extent
they can successfully solve this differentiation resolution problem [15].
In this paper, we propose another approach to achieving forge-resilient biometric systems,
from the temporal (time-dependence) sense.
The forge resilience properties of forward security and convertibility are essentially functions
of time. This is clear from their definitions, that they dictate different actions dependent on
the point in time before or after a characteristic is forged. It turns out that we can achieve
these forge resilience properties as a consequence of achieving age-dependent sensing of bio-
metric characteristics.
More precisely, given that the underlying biometric characteristic type e.g. finger’s bone den-
sity content [19], eye retina size [12, 16], ear size [22] vary as a function of time, this facilitates
the additional sensing of the characteristic’s age, thus allowing for age-dependent sensing.
The gist of our approach is to design the sensing component as a function of time, such that
it measures the age of the biometric characteristic in addition to the characteristic value itself.
Then, upon forgery at time t′, a subsequent snapshot St′ of the real characteristic is imme-
diately sensed, and this is used as the reference point to outdate all sensed characteristics
of an earlier age (note that this would include the forged one). This ability to differentiate
between sensed characteristics as a function of time immediately implies forward security and
convertibility. In more detail, since all snapshots St˜ (for t˜ < t
′) of an earlier age than that of
St′ are obsoleted, the security of the biometric system after forgery no longer relies on them,
and so this security is retained even after forgery. Convertibility is implied since the once
binding and irrevokable snapshots St˜ are essentially revoked via obsoletion.
After all, ageing is very much an inherent property of the human body anyway, so it makes
sense to directly use this to differentiate between the different sensed snapshots as a function
of time (and more specifically the age of the sensed biometric characteristic).
4 Construction
A forge-resilient biometric system B′ = (S, E ,M′,R) is a 4-tuple of the following algorithms:
4sensor; St ← S(C, t) : This senses the physical biometric characteristic C of the human
body, as well as senses the age t of the characteristic, and outputs an age-dependent
biometric snapshot St.
extractor; Ft ← E(St) : This processes the biometric snapshot St and extracts at its out-
put an age-dependent biometric feature Ft, that is essentially a representation of the
biometric characteristic.
matcher; D ←M′(Ft, dB) : This takes as input a biometric feature Ft and a database dB
of stored biometric feature templates F˜ ; and via a matching process defined by some
predetermined rules then outputs a decision D ∈ {“yes”, “no”} signifying the biometric
authentication result, i.e. whether Ft matches to some F˜ ∈ dB.
resolver; θ ← R(F 0, F 1) : This takes as input two biometric features F 0, F 1 and then out-
puts a verdict θ ∈ {0, 1} signifying which feature is the outcome of a later snapshot, i.e.
is more recent.
Forward (and Backward) Security. Forward (resp. backward) security refers to the
system remaining secure for the time period before (resp. after) compromise; in our context
compromise corresponds to characteristic forgery.
Let t′ denote the age of the biometric characteristic at the point of forgery. Define an instance
of the forge-resilient biometric system B′ where its matcher M′ algorithm is as follows:
• D ←M′(Ft, dB):
1. Access from database dB the feature Ft′ corresponding to the point of forgery t
′.
2. Run R(Ft, Ft′) to get the verdict θ. If θ = 0, this indicates the characteristic feature
Ft corresponds to an age after (or equal to) the forgery, and so output D = “no”
indicating that it should be disregarded, and quit. Otherwise, proceed to the next
step.
3. Run M(Ft, F˜ ) for each of the features F˜ in the database dB; to obtain the output
D, which is returned as the final output.
The biometric system B′ instantiated above achieves forward security since the matcher never
passes any feature that is more recent than the one that was forged, yet features before the
forgery incident remain passable even after this forgery incident. In the same vein, backward
security can be achieved for a respectively defined matcher algorithm.
Convertibility. The notion of convertibility refers to the system removing the irrevocability
property of biometric features that are more aged (or of the same age) as a forged feature.
Define an instance of the forge-resilient biometric system B′ where its matcherM′ algorithm
is as defined above and furthermore has an additional update U ′ algorithm defined as follows:
• R ← U ′(dB, Ft′ ,K): This algorithm takes as input the database dB of stored biometric
features, a feature Ft′ corresponding to the point of forgery, and a secret key K known
only to the administrator of the system.
1. The key K is checked for correctness, upon which the algorithm proceeds to the next
step.
2. The feature Ft′ is entered into the database, overwriting any previous Ft′ value.
3. A status reply R indicating successful or failure to update, is output.
The biometric system B′ instantiated above achieves convertibility since the the most recently
updated Ft′ would subsequently invalidate all features Ft aged after or equal to the forgery
via the forge-resilient matcher algorithm M′.
5 The Case of (In)Existence
With the discussions in the preceeding sections, it appears that the existence of forge-resilient
secure biometric systems (in both the sense of forward-security and convertibility) relies fun-
damentally on the existence of age-dependent sensing technology and corresponding resolver
technology within the field of physical and/or materials sciences.
Contrast this to conventional provably secure systems e.g. public key cryptography which
rely on fundamental mathematical assumptions and correspondingly the existence of solving
algorithms that can invalidate the assumptions.
56 Signposting
We draw on the main points to be derived from the above discussion in this paper.
† The security of a biometric system relies fundamentally on the underlying enabling technol-
ogy, that of physical biometric sensing within the field of physical and materials sciences.
In literature, one class of such sensors have been proposed to offer some form of forge
resilience: liveness sensors. In this work, we have proposed another class: age-dependent
sensors. It remains a constant open question if such sensors exist that resist forgeries, be-
cause advances in physical sciences lead to both an improvement in sensing technology as
well as in forgery technology because they are essentially based on the same technology.
† We can only say so much about the actual security of a biometric system, because any
security statement is necessarily relative; relative to the underlying enabling technology
and relative to the unforgeability of the underlying sensing technology.
References
1. A. Abhyankar and S.A.C. Schukers, “Integrating a Wavelet based Perspiration Liveness
Check with Fingerprint Recognition,” Pattern Recognition, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2009, pp. 452-
464.
2. A. Antonelli, R. Cappelli, D. Maio and D. Maltoni, “Fake Finger Detection by Skin Dis-
tortion Analysis,” IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2006,
pp. 360-373.
3. D.A. Atchison, E.L. Maxwell, S. Kasthurirangnan, J.M. Pope, G. Smith and P.G. Swann,
“Age-related Changes in Optical and Biometric Charateristics of Emmetropic Eyes,” Jour-
nal of Vision, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2008, pp. 1-20.
4. D. Baldiserra, A. Franco, D. Maio and D. Maltoni, “Fake Fingerprint Detection by Odor
Analysis,” Proc. ICB ’06, LNCS 3832, 2006, pp. 265-272.
5. BBC, “Japanese Smokers to Face Age Test,” last revised 12 May 2008. Available online
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7395910.stm, accessed 30 March 2009.
6. M. Bellare and S. Miner, “A Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme,” Advances in
Cryptology - Crypto ’99, LNCS 1666, 1999, pp. 431-448.
7. M. Bellare and B.S. Yee, “Forward-Security in Private-Key Cryptography,” Topics in
Cryptology - CT-RSA ’03, LNCS 2612, 2003, pp. 1-18.
8. BusinessWeek, “Biometrics: Vein Scanners Show Promise,” 6 February 2007. Available on-
line at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/feb2007/gb20070206 099354.htm,
accessed 30 March 2009.
9. R. Derakhshani, S.A.C. Schukers, L.A. Hornak and L. O’Gorman, “Determination of Vi-
tality from a Non-invasive Biomedical Measurement for Use in Fingerprint Scanners,”
Pattern Recognition, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2003, pp. 383-396.
10. Y. Dodis, M.K. Franklin, J. Katz and M. Yung, “Intrusion-Resilient Public-Key Encryp-
tion,” Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA ’03, LNCS 2612, 2003, pp. 19-32.
11. Y. Dodis, J. Katz, S. Xu and M. Yung, “Key-Insulated Public-Key Cryptosystems,”
Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt ’02, LNCS 2332, 2002, pp. 65-82.
12. Andrew C. Gallager, “Determining the Age of a Human Subject in a Digital Image,” US
Patent Application, US Patent & Trademark Office, 2 March 2006.
13. G. Itkis and L. Reyzin, “SiBIR: Signer-Base Intrusion-Resilient Signatures,” Advances in
Cryptology - Crypto ’02, LNCS 2442, 2002, pp. 499-514.
14. C. Karlof, J.D. Tygar and D. Wagner, “Conditioned-safe Ceremonies and a User Study
of an Application to Web Authentication,” Proc. NDSS ’09, to appear.
15. T. Matsumoto, H. Matsumoto, K. Yamada and S. Hoshino, “Impact of Artificial Gummy
Fingers on Fingerprint Systems,” Proc. SPIE, Vol. 4677, Optical Security and Counterfeit
Deterrence Techniques IV, 2002.
16. New Scientist, “Red-eye Age Checker,” 27 April 2006. Available online at
http://www.newscientist.com/blog/invention/2006/04/red-eye-age-checker.html, ac-
cessed 30 March 2009.
17. R.C.-W. Phan, K.-K.R. Choo and S.-H. Heng, “Security of a Leakage-Resilient Protocol
for Key Establishment and Mutual Authentication,” Proc. ProvSec ’07, LNCS 4784, 2007,
pp. 169-177.
18. D. Pointcheval and S. Zimmer, “Multi-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange,” Proc. ANC
’08, LNCS 5037, 2008, pp. 277-295.
619. RSA, “RSA Security and i-Mature Partner on Next-Generation Biometric Technology to
Further Protect Children on the Internet,” 7 February 2005.
20. Sankei Sport, “Magazine Bought Photos of ... Certain Loopholes in
the Vending Machine,” in Japanese, 24 June 2008. Available online at
http://www.sanspo.com/shakai/news/080624/sha0806240502003-n1.htm, accessed
30 March 2009.
21. S. Shin, K. Kobara and H. Imai, “Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Establishment
Protocols,” Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt ’03, LNCS 2894, 2003, pp. 155-172.
22. R. Tan, V. Osman and G. Tan, “Ear Size as a Predictor of Chronological Age,” Archives
of Gerontology and Geriatrics, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1997, pp. 187-191.
